

NOTE 75 May 1972

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I was worried about my colleagues continuing to estimate that the Sovs would NOT deploy offensive weapons to Cuba. This Saturday I came to the office & read 100+ raw reports re Cuba & drafted this to take to a meeting of the BNE on Monday.

Sat am 12 Oct 62,  
before Mon. 14 Oct 62

We continue to believe that the overriding Soviet objective in its program of military aid to Cuba is to secure a communist base in the W/H (promotion of communist aims in for the conduct of the cold war against) Latin America. The rapid pace of the program & its scale & nature indicate a Soviet intention to erect a defense of such strength as to require a substantial over ~~conventional~~ armed attack to overcome it. In a few months the Soviets have succeeded in both respects.

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We have estimated and we continue to regard as highly likely that the Soviets do not intend to ~~stop~~ end the program at a <sup>mere</sup> point where ~~the~~ a US invasion of Cuba would occasion large numbers of civilian casualties.

Beyond this, however,

The Soviets have clearly had in mind certain important bonus effects to be achieved <sup>if they</sup> ~~with a~~ could, without prompting US military ~~gradual change for purely~~ defensive counteraction, gradually introduce arms of a more or

more incontrovertably offensive

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The arrival of the 28's, and the probable adaptation of the fishing port " for use by Soviet submarines, illustrate this development.

nature. The two most obvious <sup>bonus effects</sup> ~~of these~~ would be the manifestation of unchallenged communist military power in the Monroe Doctrine area ~~and~~ and the strength to be given Soviet ~~of~~ public statements concerning the intolerable threat ~~to the Soviet~~ that US overseas missile ~~and~~ other bases offer to Soviet security. If <sup>in future</sup> the Soviets <sup>should</sup> ~~could~~ install <sup>even</sup> ~~or~~ a modest long range S/S missile capability, without prompting a vigorous US response in Cuba, they would ~~have a~~

~~potentially~~ regard such an act as the

accomplishment of a major cold war

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it is possible  
gain. Thus ~~we believe~~ that the  
Soviets will <sup>gradually</sup> move in this direction  
- always taking strictest notice  
of the US response - and not  
pushing beyond ~~the point~~ what  
they estimate the danger point.  
They fully realize that should they  
pass <sup>this</sup> ~~the~~ point the likelihood of  
the loss of Cuba would be very  
high ~~without this~~ unless they were  
prepared to go to general war. ~~He~~  
~~do not believe for one moment~~  
~~that the Soviets would contemplate~~

~~General war for the sake of Cuba.~~

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all the members of the BNE,  
 Whereas ~~we~~ believe that  
 the Soviets would <sup>not</sup> contemplate  
 going to General War for the sake  
 of Cuba, some of us feel that if  
 the Soviets felt they ~~can~~ could  
 install MRBMs without  
 appreciable danger of General  
 War they almost certainly  
 would for the reasons given  
 above. ~~(specifically, the possibility of a nuclear war)~~

insert  
 p. 2

Other members of the Board  
 believe that the Soviets would  
 not install them in any  
 circumstances. These members

5a

*Insert*

Thus in our view the  
matter of whether or not the Soviets  
decide to install such missiles  
will depend ~~on~~ almost entirely  
on US actions in the interim.

rest their case on two arguments.

①

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We have estimated on the basis of  
 (good?) evidence that MRBM sites in  
 the (western) Soviet Union consist of 4  
 launchers which require servicing <sup>(support)</sup> & <sup>h</sup>  
 personnel to the number 1000-1300.  
 If installed in Cuba <sup>nearly</sup> all such  
 personnel would have to be Russian  
 for a matter of many months. War heads  
 would require special storage areas  
 and would of course be under <sup>(mandatory)</sup>  
 (Special communications arrangements with the USSR would be <sup>h</sup>  
 strictest Soviet control. Even for a  
 token installation of a ~~single~~ <sup>few</sup> sites  
 extremely  
 preparations would be almost  
 impossible to conceal. ~~It is~~



2

Should the Soviets choose to develop

this to be ~~more~~ free to serve

(- to, say, 10 sites -)

a hot war use, the augmentation

of ~~the~~ or ~~the~~ effort would be

impossible to conceal.

Sherman -

I'm very chagrined to go home with this Cuban memo unsettled, but I've got an odd attack of dizzy spells, unfamiliar to me, which is making me pretty ineffective.

I hope I was still being effective when I decided to try my hand at a new draft. Not only were Huizenga/Matthias unhappy about your suggestion, but I thought it too bad and necessary that the BNE should report a split position, not about the conclusion of the analysis, but about the reasoning along the way.

My new draft reserves the whole problem for the last paragraph, which I'm sure you'll all want to jigger at least and probably rewrite altogether. It relegates the secrecy question to an annex and omits all the strategic argument, contenting itself with a single estimative sentence in the first para. The military analysis can of course go back in if you like.

25X1  are both au courant on all this and at your disposal. Sorry to bug out, hope to be in tomorrow.

25X1